Non-Oil GDP Share: 70.5% ▲ +9.5pp vs 2017 | QS Ranking — SQU: #334 ▲ ↑28 places | Fiscal Balance: +2.8% GDP ▲ 3rd surplus year | CPI Rank: 50th ▲ +20 places | Global Innovation Index: 69th ▲ +10 vs 2022 | Green H₂ Pipeline: $30B+ ▲ 2 new deals 2025 | Gross Public Debt: ~35% GDP ▲ ↓ from 44% | Digitalised Procedures: 2,680 ▲ of 2,869 target | Non-Oil GDP Share: 70.5% ▲ +9.5pp vs 2017 | QS Ranking — SQU: #334 ▲ ↑28 places | Fiscal Balance: +2.8% GDP ▲ 3rd surplus year | CPI Rank: 50th ▲ +20 places | Global Innovation Index: 69th ▲ +10 vs 2022 | Green H₂ Pipeline: $30B+ ▲ 2 new deals 2025 | Gross Public Debt: ~35% GDP ▲ ↓ from 44% | Digitalised Procedures: 2,680 ▲ of 2,869 target |
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Youth Unemployment Crisis

The structural causes and consequences of high youth unemployment in Oman

Scale of the Problem

Youth unemployment in Oman is officially estimated at 13-15 percent for the 15-24 age group, but broader measures that include discouraged workers and the underemployed suggest the true figure is significantly higher. Among university graduates, the waiting period between graduation and employment can extend to two or more years. Female graduate unemployment is particularly high, reflecting both labour market discrimination and limited opportunities in sectors deemed culturally appropriate. Youth unemployment is concentrated among those with general education qualifications rather than technical or vocational training.

Structural Causes

The causes are deeply structural: a dual labour market that reserves the public sector for nationals while the private sector relies on cheaper expatriate labour; an education system that prioritises academic credentials over employable skills; a demographic bulge that delivers more graduates annually than the economy creates quality jobs; cultural preferences for government employment that lead graduates to queue rather than accept private-sector positions; and limited entrepreneurship infrastructure for those who might create their own opportunities.

Consequences

Persistent youth unemployment has corrosive effects beyond the economic. Social frustration among educated but unemployed young people represents a political risk, as demonstrated across the Arab world during 2011. Delayed household formation and marriage affect social cohesion and mental health. Skills depreciation during prolonged unemployment makes re-entry more difficult over time. Brain drain, as talented young Omanis seek opportunities abroad, represents a loss of the human capital that the education system invested in developing. Gender impacts are compounded as families restrict female mobility when employment is unavailable.

Integrated Solutions

Addressing youth unemployment requires coordinated action across education, labour market, and economic policy: align education with labour market needs through curriculum reform and employer engagement; expand quality apprenticeships and internships; enforce Omanisation targets in sectors with genuine national employment potential; support youth entrepreneurship with finance, mentoring, and regulatory simplification; develop labour-intensive sectors (tourism, hospitality, creative industries) that naturally suit younger workers; and use technology to create platform-economy opportunities. This is not a problem that any single ministry or policy can solve.