Non-Oil GDP Share: 70.5% ▲ +9.5pp vs 2017 | QS Ranking — SQU: #334 ▲ ↑28 places | Fiscal Balance: +2.8% GDP ▲ 3rd surplus year | CPI Rank: 50th ▲ +20 places | Global Innovation Index: 69th ▲ +10 vs 2022 | Green H₂ Pipeline: $30B+ ▲ 2 new deals 2025 | Gross Public Debt: ~35% GDP ▲ ↓ from 44% | Digitalised Procedures: 2,680 ▲ of 2,869 target | Non-Oil GDP Share: 70.5% ▲ +9.5pp vs 2017 | QS Ranking — SQU: #334 ▲ ↑28 places | Fiscal Balance: +2.8% GDP ▲ 3rd surplus year | CPI Rank: 50th ▲ +20 places | Global Innovation Index: 69th ▲ +10 vs 2022 | Green H₂ Pipeline: $30B+ ▲ 2 new deals 2025 | Gross Public Debt: ~35% GDP ▲ ↓ from 44% | Digitalised Procedures: 2,680 ▲ of 2,869 target |
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GCC Unity and Internal Challenges

The state of Gulf Cooperation Council cohesion and its implications for Oman

The State of GCC Cohesion

The Gulf Cooperation Council, established in 1981, has faced recurring internal tensions that undermine its stated goal of regional integration. The Qatar blockade (2017-2021) represented the most severe rupture, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposing a comprehensive diplomatic and economic embargo on Qatar. While the Al-Ula Declaration of January 2021 formally ended the crisis, underlying tensions persist around leadership ambitions, foreign policy alignment, and the pace of integration. The GCC’s institutional capacity remains limited compared to its economic weight.

Oman’s Position

Oman has consistently positioned itself as a neutral, stabilising force within the GCC. The Sultanate refused to join the Qatar blockade, maintaining diplomatic and travel links with Doha throughout the crisis. This independence reflects Oman’s broader foreign policy principle of maintaining relations with all parties. Oman has similarly avoided taking sides in Saudi-UAE competition over regional leadership. This neutrality is sometimes frustrating to larger GCC partners but is widely respected as principled and consistent.

Economic Integration Challenges

GCC economic integration has underperformed expectations despite decades of effort. The customs union, launched in 2003, remains incomplete with ongoing disputes over revenue sharing and port of entry rules. The common market, monetary union, and rail connectivity projects have all faced delays. For Oman, deeper integration offers access to a larger market (the GCC’s combined GDP exceeds USD 2 trillion) but also poses competitive risks, particularly from the UAE’s dominant services sector and Saudi Arabia’s scale advantages in manufacturing.

Implications for Oman

GCC dynamics directly affect Oman’s economic prospects. Intra-GCC cooperation on trade facilitation, labour mobility, and infrastructure connectivity would benefit Oman significantly. Conversely, fragmentation forces Oman to develop bilateral solutions and limits the collective negotiating power of the bloc in trade agreements with external partners. Oman’s diplomatic capital within the GCC depends on maintaining its reputation for neutrality while quietly advocating for integration measures that serve its economic interests.