Abraham Accords Context
The Abraham Accords of 2020, which normalised relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, represented a paradigm shift in Arab-Israeli relations. The accords decoupled normalisation from the Palestinian question, prioritising bilateral economic and security interests. Saudi Arabia’s potential normalisation with Israel – reportedly close before the October 2023 Gaza conflict derailed the process – would represent the most consequential expansion of the framework. The ongoing Gaza crisis has fundamentally complicated the normalisation trajectory.
Oman’s Historical Position
Oman’s approach to Israel has been characteristically independent. Sultan Qaboos hosted Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 and Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018, maintaining that engagement – not isolation – serves the peace process. Oman operated a trade office with Israel in the 1990s and early 2000s before closing it during the second intifada. The Sultanate has consistently stated that normalisation should be linked to meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood, while pragmatically engaging with Israel when circumstances allow.
Current Dynamics
The Gaza conflict beginning in October 2023 has frozen normalisation momentum across the region and intensified public opposition to Israel engagement in every Arab country. Oman, reflecting public sentiment and its own principled position, has condemned Israeli military operations and called for Palestinian rights. Any move toward normalisation is off the table during active conflict. Even after a resolution, the political cost of normalisation will be significantly higher than it was before October 2023.
Strategic Calculus
Oman’s calculus on Israel normalisation involves multiple factors: the Palestinian situation and public opinion; potential economic benefits (technology, tourism, investment); GCC dynamics (following or diverging from Saudi Arabia); and the US relationship (Washington has pushed normalisation as a regional priority). Oman is unlikely to be a normalisation pioneer but could follow if Saudi Arabia leads and if Palestinian statehood progress provides political cover. The timing and conditions remain highly uncertain, and the issue is more politically sensitive than at any point since the Oslo Accords.